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Executive summary 
The MSF response to cholera in Haiti was of extraordinary scope and happened under extremely 
difficult circumstances: cholera re-appeared for the first time in 100 years and spread rapidly; 
the humanitarian situation in the country was already bad, and had worsened after the 
earthquake in January 2010; there was political unrest; and there had been no particular 
preparation for an outbreak of the disease.  
 
MSF’s Operational Centre Geneva (OCG) requested an evaluation of its response in order to 
analyse the overall effectiveness and appropriateness of different strategies used. The 
evaluation process had to ensure sharing and documentation of the main lessons learned for 
future cholera interventions. The evaluation methodology included a review of epidemiological 
data and documents, a web survey among international staff, interviews, a lessons learned 
workshop, and a field visit to Haiti.  
 
Main findings 
 
A total of 31,558 cholera cases were treated in OCG cholera treatment structures in two 
departments (Nord and Ouest–Léogâne). This equals 15% of all cases reported to the Haitian 
Ministry of Health Services and Population (MSPP) between October and February 2010 
(overall, MSF sections treated 110,445 cases, or 53% of all cases). The overall case fatality rate 
(CFR) in OCG structures was 1.5%, which is higher than the total MSF CFR of 1.1%. 
  
The explanation may be that while other MSF sections worked in urban settings, OCG covered a 
lot of remote rural areas, where access and supervision were more difficult. According to OCG 
data, the attack rate would have been 4% in the Nord department and 1.35% in Ouest–Léogâne. 
This will need to be compared to the final results of a population-based retrospective survey to 
assess morbidity and mortality due to cholera by Epicentre. Preliminary findings suggest an 
attack rate above 10%. 
 
MSF played an important technical role in the nationwide cholera response. Medical 
coordinators provided input to national guidelines and strategy, while MSF teams trained and 
supported a number of other actors on technical issues.  
 
Social mobilisation was key to rapid intervention and scale-up. Timely and appropriate 
communications efforts, which concentrated on local media, helped to gain acceptance and 
utilisation of services, despite initial public consternation. Thanks to existing information, 
education and communication (IEC) capacities in Léogâne, expertise was quickly made available 
and a comprehensive strategy implemented.  
 
A reasonable balance was found between preventive and curative activities after the initial 
phase of the emergency (six weeks). Efforts could have been timelier, with a more rapid 
deployment and more initial resources, and with separate teams responsible for curative and 
preventive action.  
 
A decentralised rural strategy was implemented, effectively, but with some delay. A 
widespread network of cholera treatment units (CTUs), cholera treatment centres (CTCs) and 
oral rehydration points (ORPs) was established by multidisciplinary teams composed of 
medical, WatSan and IEC staff.  
 
Risk assessment and preparedness for cholera were insufficient in Haiti. The risk of a 
diarrhoeal epidemic in this context was downplayed too much given the sanitary situation, 
which worsened after the earthquake.  
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The management of cholera in pregnant women was innovative and led to good outcomes. 
The protocol developed was judged simple, feasible in an emergency context, and cost-efficient, 
especially in terms of lives saved.  
 
Overall case management was good, but there is space to improve specific aspects, for example 
the utility of Plan A, B and C classifications, the systematic use of zinc for children, the 
availability of intraosseous drills, the overuse of intravenous (IV) fluids etc.  
 
An overall WatSan strategy for community outreach was lacking, despite the water and 
sanitation activities carried out around cholera treatment facilities. For excreta disposal, an 
innovative process using physiochemical treatment with hydrated lime (piloted by OCA in Haiti) 
was applied where safe pits could not be provided. 
 
Epidemiological data collection on field level was appropriate, though it focused on data from 
OCG-supported health facilities only, and did not include surveillance of the general population 
(which some would like to see). Data were effectively used to map cases, plan and orientate 
activities.  
 
Technical briefings of expatriate staff did not happen systematically before departure, 
increasing the burden in the field. The deployment of a ‘flying training team’ for the various 
upcoming CTUs and CTCs proved successful.  
 
Laboratory services to understand parallel infections were underused. In the absence of 
regular biological confirmation, treatment protocols were not adapted to possible other 
bacterial causes of diarrhoea. 
 
The exit strategy in the Nord department was clear, with timely and successful efforts to train, 
involve and communicate with other partners, primarily the MSPP.  
 
Cholera vaccination was not implemented as a preventive activity. 
 
 
Recommendations for future cholera responses: 
 
1.  Ensure a balance between PREVENTIVE and CURATIVE strategies. 
 
2.  Strengthen the epidemiological capacity to monitor and orientate the response. 
 
3.  Define a clear WatSan strategy outside CTCs and CTUs. 
 
4.  Develop guidelines for social mobilisation in cholera response. 
 
5.  Invest in staff preparation and training for cholera response. 
 
6.  Use laboratory services to monitor and react to outbreak dynamics. 
 
7.  Improve specific issues in case management (eg use of zinc). 
 
8.  Prepare to use vaccination as part of a prevention strategy. 
 
9.  Contribute to the revision of the MSF Cholera Guidelines.  
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1  Introduction  
1.1  Background 
The earthquake of 12 January 2010, which killed an estimated 230,000 people and injured 
300,000, damaged Haiti’s already weak health system. Nearly 1.5 million people were left 
homeless and moved into spontaneous settlement sites throughout Port-au-Prince and other 
cities. These sites have poor sanitation and hygiene conditions and leave their residents 
vulnerable to diseases – particularly water-borne diseases. 
 
Haiti is the poorest country on the American continent, with more than 70 percent of the 
population living on less than US$2 per day. Before the earthquake, 70 to 80 percent of Haitians 
could not afford healthcare. Even before the earthquake, the healthcare system failed to address 
the basic medical needs of the population in Port-au-Prince; the effects of the earthquake on this 
already deficient healthcare system were devastating. 
 
One year after the earthquake, at least 800,000 people were still sleeping in tents or in the open 
each night, while rising political instability has brought additional challenges. 
 
Since 19 October 2010, when the first cases of cholera were confirmed, Haiti has faced one of 
the most severe outbreaks of cholera of the past century. The outbreak has been made more 
complex by the humanitarian situation resulting from the earthquake. 
 
Figure 1: Humanitarian crisis in Haiti 
 
Source: ACF, Haiti Le bilan 1 an après, 2011 
 
1.2  Chronology of events and MSF involvement 
MSF has been present and active in Haiti for the past 19 years. OCG started operations in 
immediate response to the earthquake in January 2010 and – following the emergency 
intervention – constructed and continues to run a container hospital in Léogâne.  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, when hundreds of thousands of people were 
forced to find whatever shelter they could in ad hoc displacement camps with dangerously 
substandard hygiene facilities and little or no services, a potential outbreak of disease was a 
major concern.  
 
In the middle of October, word came from the Artibonite region in central Haiti, north of the 
capital, that patients were presenting with cholera-like symptoms. Cholera had not been seen in 7 
 
Haiti in many decades, but nonetheless the signs – rapid and severe dehydration caused by 
excessive vomiting and diarrhoea – were all too apparent.  
 
On 21 October 2010, the day after MSF received word of the cholera-like symptoms, an MSF 
team travelled to Saint Marc and Petite Rivière, in the Artibonite region, to work with local 
health staff and authorities to start treating patients. The MSPP – with the support of the Pan-
American Health Organization (PAHO) – investigated and declared the outbreak immediately 
after the first cases were confirmed.  
 
Soon more cases were presenting in Saint Marc, in nearby Petite Rivière, and soon in Gonaïves, 
and teams had to quickly scale up their capacity in the region. The next area to experience the 
outbreak was in the north – the cities of Cap Haïtien, Port de Paix and Gros Morne – beginning on 
29 October. 
 
At this point, it was clear to MSF’s field managers that the cholera outbreak was going to be a 
huge issue that required a large-scale response across several sectors. On 31 October, large 
numbers of patients began arriving at MSF-supported hospitals in Port-au-Prince’s Cité Soleil 
slum with the symptoms of cholera. 
 
The consensus was that cholera was very likely to spread widely in a country where most people 
lacked access to clean drinking water and sanitation, where the population was unfamiliar with 
the necessary prevention measures, and where most national health staff had no previous 
experience of the disease. But the transmission dynamics were difficult to predict, because the 
only precedents were several decades old. 
 
The MSF team in Léogâne prepared for cholera cases and had set up a CTU next to the hospital 
by the time the first cases arrived in the week of 25-29 October. The team’s medical coordinator 
(MedCo) also anticipated the challenges presented by cholera during pregnancy, given the high 
number of deliveries in Léogâne’s maternity ward, and the team started to consider what 
specific measures to take.  
 
In the Nord department, MSF were asked to intervene by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
and PAHO. Between the MSF sections it was decided that OCG would  do an exploratory mission. 
The situation in the Nord department was out of control and becoming worse: cases of cholera 
were increasing rapidly, panic and stigmatisation were rife amongst the population, and dead 
bodies were being dumped in the street. The MSPP had started to set up a treatment centre in 
the sports centre next to the hospital, but was overwhelmed by the situation. An OCG team 
arrived on 2 November and the following days and supported the cholera response in 
collaboration with the MSPP. 
 
By late December, the Nord, Nord-Ouest and Sud-Est departments, the Artibonite region, and the 
area just west of Port-au-Prince were all seeing case numbers decrease. However, the cholera 
outbreak was not yet over – even in July 2011, during our visit, the outbreak had not stopped. 
Aside from MSF, the Cuban Medical Brigades have been the most active actor in the area of 
treatment of cholera cases in Haiti. 
 
MSF was able to continue working throughout several bouts of violence in the country. During 
riots in the northern city of Cap Haïtien, OCG teams still managed to open new CTCs and travel 
throughout the city to provide treatment services. In early December 2010, when rioting rocked 
Port-au-Prince following elections, MSF was still able to provide treatment in its network of 
CTCs in the capital. 
 
Globally, MSF’s main focus in cholera outbreaks is on the most severe cases – essentially on 
saving lives – while pushing other actors to fill in the gaps by carrying out prevention activities. 
But in Haiti, OCG adopted a different strategy: maintaining a balance between curative and 
preventive activities, with a focus on carrying out community awareness efforts at an early 
stage, even when curative services were overstretched. 8 
 
 
Figure 2: Map of Haiti 
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2  Evaluation process 
2.1  Objectives of the evaluation  
The objectives of the evaluation are:  
·  To document the OCG strategies used, especially the innovative ones. 
·  To describe the constraints and challenges of the Haitian setting. 
·  To analyse the main epidemiological outcomes. 
·  To analyse the factors which influenced effectiveness of the intervention strategies. 
·  To describe the main lessons learned for future cholera interventions. 
·  To propose the development of a new OCG intervention framework/ model for cholera in 
particular and for diarrhoeal diseases in general. 
 
As part of learning before, the review also describes the take-up of lessons learned documented 
in previous MSF cholera evaluation reports. 
 
The WHO’s Cholera Guidelines and MSF’s 2004 Cholera Guidelines served as a reference for this 
review. 
 
2.2  Methodology  
Combined methodologies used: 
·  Anonymous web survey by all international MSF staff in Haiti during the outbreak. 
·  Document review (see annexes). 
·  Final epidemiological data analysis. 
·  Synthesis and status of implementation of previous recommendations of former MSF 
cholera evaluations at the start of cholera outbreak in Haiti (Oct 2010). 
o  Iterative consultation through face-to-face or phone interviews of MSF key 
informants and external partners. 
These consultations were structured using a questionnaire of five open-ended questions. 
·  Participation in global meetings, including round table discussions and presentations on 
cholera response, at: 
o  MSF Epicentre Scientific Day, 16 June 2011, Paris. 
o  WHO GOARN Steering Committee Meeting, 29-30 June 2011, Geneva . 
·  MSF lessons learned workshop, 19 July 2011, Geneva. 
·  Field visit to Haiti, 24 July to 4 August 2011 (including travel) with staff interviews and 
site observations, including visits to CTC and CTU. 
 
2.3  Limitations 
The description and comparison of costs could not be done as foreseen, due to the non-
availability of financial data.  
 
The comparison with epidemiological outcomes of a population-based retrospective survey to 
assess morbidity and mortality due to cholera in Haiti by Epicentre did not take place, because of 
a delay in the finalisation of the study.  10 
 
3  Results  
3.1  Facts and figures (epidemiological outcomes) 
MSF-OCG intervened in three main areas but, after the first rapid assessment, handed over Les 
Cayes region to other NGOs already in place. The handover included training on how to run a 
CTC and sharing of MSF protocols and guidelines. MSF-OCG concentrated on two main areas (see 
Figure 3 below): 
All Nord department (Cap Haïtien), except five sites in the southern part that were managed by 
OCP until February 2011 and then handed back to OCG. 
·  Léogâne region in Ouest department 
The other parts of the country were covered by other sections (see Figure 3 below). 
 
Figure 3: Coverage of Haiti with MSF cholera projects (all sections), January 2010 
 
 
MSF-OCG treated 15% (31,558 patients) of the patients reported to the MSPP (see Table 1 
below); 12% of reported deaths occurred in MSF-OCG structures; the CFR was 1.5%. 
 
Between them, MSF and the  Cuban Medical Brigades treated around 80% of the total number of 
cases detected and reported to the MSPP.  
 
Table 1: Cholera cases, deaths and CFR from week 24/2010 to week 5/2011, Haiti  
  Cases   Deaths  CFR  
MSPP data*   209,034   4,030   1.9% 
MSF-all 
sections**  
110,445  
(53% of MSPP cases) 
1,215  
(30% of MSPP deaths) 
1.1%*** 
MSF-OCG   31,558  
(15% of MSPP cases) 
467  
(12% of MSPP deaths) 
1.5% 
*   MSPP data from inside and outside health structures 
**   MSF data from health structures 
***   The CFR for MSF data 2011(Epicentre data may help to estimate epidemic duration) is the “lethality” of a 
subset of the population that came to MSF supported health structures. This MSF CFR does not estimate or 
represent the true lethality in the population or in rural areas. 11 
 
In Table 2 the characteristics of the Haiti epidemic for MSF-OCG are summarised and compared 
with typical patterns found in other settings. MSF-OCG health facilities were located in a mix of 
rural/open and urban settings. The attack rate was 4.03% in the Nord and 1.35% in the Ouest 
department (see Table 3). This will need to be compared with the final results of a population-
based retrospective survey to assess mortality due to cholera in Haiti by Epicentre. Preliminary 
findings suggest an estimated real attack rate above 10%. 
  
The CFR of 1.5% attests to the good quality of care delivered in MSF-OCG health structures. The 
CFR is still higher than for all MSF structures in general, which may be explained by the fact that 
OCG treatment facilities were covering much more remote rural areas. Therefore access to MSF 
health structures was more difficult and more patients presented late when they were already 
severely dehydrated.  
 
Table 2: Typical characteristics of cholera outbreaks and comparison with Haiti outbreak 
Characteristics  Open 
situation/ 
rural 
Urban 
settings/ 
slums 
Closed 
situation/ 
refugee/IDP 
camps 
Haiti 2010-11  
(MSF-OCG data only) 
Delay to epidemic 
peak (in weeks) 
6 to 12   4 to 8  2 to 4   Unknown*   
Epidemic duration  3 to 6 
months 
2 to 4 
months 
1 to 3 months  Unknown**  
Population 
density  
Low  High   High to very 
high  
Low (rural), high (urban) 
Attack rate 
 
0.1 to 2%  1 to 5%  1 to 5%  2.1%, based on MSPP data till 
week 6 of 2011, using 2009 
population data (209,034 cases 
for 9,923,243 susceptible people 
ie whole population)*** 
Case fatality rate 
 
<5%  2 to 5%  <1%  1.5% for MSF-OCG data 
1.1% for all MSF,  
1.9% for total MSPP, incl. MSF  
Population 
characteristics 
Numerous, 
mobile,  
scattered 
Dense, 
mobile 
Small, not very 
mobile 
Numerous, mobile following 
earthquake, scattered 
*   Intervention and data collection in the Nord department started when outbreak was already ongoing 
**   Variable depending on the different sites; now endemic  >10 months, not under control in July 
***   2011(Epicentre data may help to estimate epidemic duration) 
 
MSF-OCG epidemiological data and epidemic curves must be interpreted as two different sub-
identities (Nord department and Ouest department–Léogâne), as the dynamic of the outbreaks 
and the time of intervention were totally distinct. Even within the Nord department, different 
epidemics occurred (see Figure 4 below). 
 
The main epidemiological outcomes are described in Table 3 below. There were nearly 10 times 
more cases managed in the Nord department (28,654) than in the Ouest-Léogâne (2 ,904).  
 
Of those arriving in treatment centres, only 18% were severe forms (IV+/- ORS) in the Nord 
department compared to 44% in the Ouest–Léogâne. 
 
Figures on IV consumption need to be further investigated. Calculations suggest a consumption 
ranging from 13.7 l to 30.7 l/severe case.1 An overuse of IV fluids was confirmed by most of the 
interviewees, and may have the following explanations: 
·  Inappropriate case management (IV  fluids kept for too long, over-hydration, etc). 
                                                 
1 According to the epidemiological data presented in the Epicentre epi data collection tool, patients were divided into 
severe (IV+/- ORS) or moderate (ORS only) cases and not according to Plan A, B or C. It seems that the severe cases 
were considered as Plan B+C and moderate Plan A. 12 
 
·  The volume reported could be from the pharmacy stock level, and therefore include all 
“lost”, broken bags of Ringer’s lactate, as well as all the donations made to other 
partners.  
 
Table 3: Summary of main epidemiological outcomes in the two MSF-OCG sites, Haiti 
Observed figures 
Week 42 to week 5 
Nord department  
(pop 711 294) 
Ouest department–
Léogâne 
(pop 214 861) 
First cases treated by MSF  Week 42 (22  Oct)  Week 43 (28 Oct) 
Expected cases*  18,000  4,400 
Total  cases   28,654  2,904 
Cases <5 yrs   3,244 (11% of total cases)  253 (9% of total cases) 
Number of deaths among cases  433  34 
Total CFR**   1.5% (mixed of closed and 
open settings) 
1.2% (1 open setting with 
3 closed settings) 
Attack rate   4.03%  1.35% 
Peak outbreak  1 peak (week 50)   2 peaks (weeks 51 and 2)  
Number of cases/week at peak   4,052 cases   374 and 316 cases 
respectively 
Proportion of severe forms (IV+/- 
ORS and Plan C)*** 
18% 
 
44% 
*   assuming an AR of 3%. 
**   CFR <1% if appropriate treatment in closed setting, 2% to 5% in open and semi-closed settings. 
***   usually approximately 25% of severe form. 
 
In both departments there was a slow but continuously increasing proportion of children <5yrs, 
which indicates the presence of other diarrhoeal diseases mixed with the cholera cases. 
 
3.1.1  Epidemic and response in the Nord department  
The cholera epidemic in the Nord department started on 22 October 2010; the first cases were 
reported in Cap Haïtien in week 42. A CTC was put in place by the MSPP general hospital in the 
city’s sports centre. The peak of the epidemic was in December (week 50). The maximum weekly 
incidence was 0.57/10,000 population (week 50). The CFR climbed to more than 10% in the 
first weeks (11.1% in week 43) then decreased steeply and stayed below 2%. 
 
The second CFR peak observed in week 3 (after the epidemic peak) in children <5 yrs can be 
interpreted as the coexistence of different epidemics.  
 
The proportion of severe cases (IV +/- ORS so approximately Plan C + Plan B) reached 29% in 
week 47 and decreased to 7% in week 5.  
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Figure 4: Epidemiological graphs, Nord department, MSF-OCG, weeks 42 to 5, Haiti 
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3.1.2  Epidemic and response in the Ouest department–Léogâne 
First cases in the Ouest department–Léogâne were reported in week 43. The epidemic presented 
two peaks (week 51 and week 3), similar to what was observed in Port-au-Prince (which was 
covered by other MSF sections). The two peaks were more distinct in the epidemic curve of 
children <5yrs. The maximum weekly incidence was 0.17/10,000 populations (week 51). The 
CFR climbed to 2.9% (in week 48) then stayed around 1.5%. No deaths <5 yrs have been 
observed. 
 
The proportion of severe cases (IV +/- ORS so approximately Plan C + Plan B) reached 100% in 
week 43. It then reduced to an average of about 45 % from week 49 to reach 35% in week 5.  
 
Figure 5: Epidemiological graphs, Ouest department–Léogâne, MSF-OCG, weeks 42 to 5, Haiti 
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3.2  Innovative strategies 
The following section highlights new approaches used in the Haiti cholera response. Some 
approaches may have been used – in part – elsewhere, but in Haiti specific experiences were 
made with comprehensive strategies. 
 
3.2.1  Social mobilisation strategy 
In Haiti the close alignment between IEC/health promotion and communication was very 
important. The synergy between teams was essential, with IEC officers providing the same 
information through personal contact that communication teams were providing through the 
media.  
 
For both communication and IEC officers, the approach was proactive. They worked to 
constantly identify new opportunities and channels for communication, rapidly analysing 
people’s perceptions of what MSF was doing and at times shifting the public debate, for example 
from the controversy over the origin of the epidemic to practical options for treatment and 
prevention.  
 
The effectiveness of the strategy was confirmed by the fact that many people arriving at the 
treatment centre said they had already heard (for example, through radio spots) about the 
symptoms of cholera and where to go if they fell ill. A decrease in admissions of severe cases 
(Plan C) proved that people increasingly knew how to seek treatment rapidly. While, at the start 
of MSF’s intervention, the population rejected the idea of treatment facilities opening in their 
neighbourhood, they later on requested that treatment facilities were opened close by. MSF 
quickly became well known and highly appreciated by the population; the team received regular 
congratulations for the work they were doing.  
 
3.2.1.1  Communications strategy 
The Cap Haïtien experience showed the relevance of focusing on local communications during 
an outbreak of this magnitude. A local communications strategy was implemented and resulted 
in MSF gaining good visibility and acceptance within the community. The aim of the strategy was 
to demystify the disease, destigmatise the victims, encourage them to seek care promptly and 
keep the population updated on changes in cholera management. The approach was flexible, 
with the message being adjusted – in collaboration with the IEC and the medical team – based on 
questions posed by the population, observed changes, the evolution of the epidemic and related 
activities.  
 
Before MSF arrived, the sports centre was seen as a ’centre of death’. Initially, most journalist’s 
questions were focused on mortality. This changed with successful communications around the 
fact that the vast majority of patients were cured in the CTC.  
 
At the beginning of the epidemic, prevention messages and job announcements were made via 
the radio (followed by the ‘cholera spot’), and resulted in a shower of CVs. This was a good 
indicator that the messages were being heard by the population.  
 
One factor that was important to the success of the communications strategy was the large scale 
utilisation of mainstream local media (acknowledging the popularity of radio in Haiti). Outreach 
teams identified the radio stations listened to in rural areas. The rapid recruitment of a 
journalist from the region, who had good local media contacts, and was able to speak the 
language and understand local sensitivities, greatly facilitated relationships and work with the 
media.  
 
Complementary written information was considered important to avoid misunderstandings. 
Messages were recorded by the team and used for broadcasting repeatedly on the main radio 16 
 
and TV channels in the region. Visits to CTCs were organised for journalists and interviews with 
medical staff were facilitated (including pictures and film footage). Local health authorities were 
also involved in interviews. A progress report was prepared and delivered to the MSPP to 
provide information on the extent and evolution of work. It was combined with a message of 
thanks, focusing on the successful collaboration with the MSPP. The official closure of the CTC in 
the sports centre was carried out alongside local authorities, and with a donation of sports 
equipment, in the presence of the media. This helped ensure wide media coverage to assure 
people that it was safe to use it once again as a sports centre.  
 
A summary report is available from Aurélie Lachant, Communications Advisor at OCG.2  
 
3.2.1.2  IEC strategy 
The information, education and communications (IEC) teams were organised differently in the 
Nord department and the Ouest department-Léogâne. In Léogâne, MSF already had an IEC team 
in place who quickly shifted their attention from post-earthquake work to cholera prevention. A 
first training on cholera for the 16 health agents took place in October 2010. The IEC team in 
Léogâne was very involved in different areas of the response beyond direct prevention work, for 
example soliciting acceptance for the construction of CTUs and CTCs, mapping cholera cases, and 
collaborating closely with WatSan teams.  
 
In the Nord department there were two strategies, one focusing on the city of Cap Haïtien and its 
environs, and the second focusing on other rural communities. The latter was implemented in 
direct collaboration with the WatSan teams.  
 
Fifty-five health agents were initially recruited to cover all MSF-supported structures and to 
work with patients, accompanying family members, local associations, churches and 
communities. Their responsibility was to diffuse messages on prevention, either face-to-face or 
to a wider audience. The emphasis was on a genuine interaction with patients, based on the 
understanding that cured patients would be the best ambassadors. Group sessions were 
organised through partners, for example local authorities, churches and schools. Information 
centres were opened in four locations; when the first one opened in Cap Haïtien, it had about 
300 visitors daily.  
 
In the rural areas, mixed IEC and WatSan teams were established to work jointly on safe 
drinking water in respective communities, for example installing boards with instructions for 
water treatment near water sources. These teams worked alongside the rapid response teams, 
who intervened in communities with newly emerging cases of cholera. Later on their work was 
handed over to the ‘brigade communitaire’ organised by the MSPP.  
 
The experience and the tools used in IEC work in the Nord department are summarised in a 
report by Hugues Juillerat published in March 2011.3  
 
3.2.2  Rural strategy 
Overall deployment in the north of Haiti started from the urban centre and went on to the 
outskirts, to semi-rural areas and then finally to rural areas. CTCs and CTUs (22 structures in 
total) were established in areas with a significant number of cases. A total of 97 oral rehydration 
points (ORPs) were set up, initially on the request of the community (especially in the north), 
and then on MSF’s initiative, according to mapping and needs (ie a high number of cases in a 
given area). In the north there were intermediary forms: ‘Centre traitement intermediaries’ and 
‘stabilisation centres’ (CS). Structures were transformed before closing down to adjust to the 
                                                 
2 Aurélie Lachant: Urgence choléra en Haiti : Rapport de capitalisation sur la stratégie de communication locale mise 
en œuvre par OCG à Cap Haïtien. Novembre 2010 – Janvier 2011.  
3Hugues Juillerat: Urgence choléra en Haïti: Rapport de capitalisation sur la stratégie IEC à Cap Haïtien. Novembre 
2010 – Janvier 2011 17 
 
decreasing number of cases, for example CTCs and CTUs were scaled down to become CS and 
ORPs.  
 
Where health facilities existed, isolation corners were set up nearby in order to continue case 
management after cases had reduced. The exit criterion for MSF was five or fewer patients per 
day for one full week.  
 
Four multidisciplinary outreach teams were established to reach remote affected areas. Each 
team was composed of a medical, a WatSan and an IEC person. Their role was to follow the ORPs 
and CTIs, conduct IEC and collect data. Later on these teams became ‘rapid response teams’, 
which responded to alerts and reinforced medical and hygiene training etc.  
 
The approach in Léogâne was similar in terms of mixed teams jointly addressing the different 
areas (medical, IEC, WatSan) in collaboration with a widespread volunteer network. The model 
of ‘ORPs light’ (about 100 in total) was slightly different there: all patients were referred on, 
while in the Nord department the ORS points took care of uncomplicated plan A cases (which 
amounted to approximately one-third of cases). 
 
Severely dehydrated patients were referred from ORPs to CTUs or CTCs by public means of 
transport rented by MSF (tap-taps or moto taxis). These vehicles could be reached on a special 
number and were adapted to transport cholera patients.  
 
The OCG teams clearly considered community leaders to be important stakeholders and gave 
them responsibility for land allocation and the recruitment and motivation of community staff.  
 
3.2.3  Treating pregnant women 
Cholera in pregnancy4 is associated with high risk of stillbirth or abortion. Reported foetal loss, 
in the limited literature available, varies between 13.5% and 53%. 
 
In Haiti, more than 270,000 cholera cases were registered between October 2010 and March 
2011. Since the beginning of the outbreak, anecdotal accounts had related high foetal loss among 
women delivering in the cholera treatment units.  
 
A specialised cholera isolation unit for pregnant women was set up inside the MSF hospital 
compound in Léogâne. Treatment for obstetric complications was available, including C-
sections, neonatal resuscitation and an intensive care unit. 
 
In this unit, World Health Organization (WHO) protocols for cholera treatment were more 
aggressively applied in terms of fluid and glucose replacement. All women had intravenous 
access established at admission, regardless of their hydration status. All received antibiotic 
treatment with erythromycin. Glucose was systematically added to intravenous treatment to 
prevent hypoglycaemia. Foetal status was monitored during hospitalisation, either clinically or 
with ultrasound.  
 
Between 13 December 2010 and 28 February 2011, 102 pregnant women were admitted to the 
CTU in Léogâne. Of 102 women, 14 (13.7%) were in the first trimester, 50 (49%) in the second 
and 38 (37.3%) were in the third trimester of pregnancy. No maternal deaths occurred during 
admission to the unit. Of the 102 pregnant women, 81 (79.4%) preserved their pregnancies, 
seven (6.9%) delivered live newborns, with one neonatal death five days later, and 14 (13.7%) 
had a negative outcome: there were seven miscarriages and seven deaths in utero. Seven foetal 
losses occurred before admission, five in the second and two in the third trimester. 
                                                 
4 Summary adopted from an abstract entitled ‘Pregnancy and cholera: pregnancy outcomes from specialised cholera 
treatment units for pregnant women in Leogane, Haiti”; presented at the MSF Scientific Day in London in 2011 by 
Mathieu Bichet, Iza Ciglenecki, Javier Tena and Nelly Staderini. 
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The Léogâne experience is the largest description of outcomes of pregnancy in cholera-infected 
patients. The results of foetal loss are comparable or better than most other published results. 
This indicates that specialised cholera units for pregnant women with close follow-up and more 
aggressive rehydration could help to reduce foetal loss.  
 
3.3  Global findings and conclusion 
The cholera intervention in Haiti was of an extraordinary scope and must be considered very 
successful given the circumstances encountered: it was the first time that cholera had been seen 
in the country for 100 years; there was political unrest, a rapid spread of the disease, and there 
were no emergency-preparedness measures in place. Much of the credit for the success of the 
intervention is due to the first team in Cap Haïtien for their strategic view and hard work, but 
also for their precise prediction of how the epidemic would evolve. 
 
(1)  Difficult context 
This outbreak was made more complex by the humanitarian situation resulting from the 
12 January earthquake. The living conditions of the population in Haiti made the country 
extremely vulnerable to the spread of cholera. Responding to the outbreak was 
challenging, because the population had never seen the disease, health workers were 
inexperienced in the management of cholera, and the existing health system was 
weakened by the earthquake. Pre-election violence and demonstrations played a 
significant role in limiting response activities at the very beginning, when supplies were 
blocked for days on the road.  
 
(2)  Lead technical role played by MSF in cholera response  
From the very start of the cholera alert, and the declaration of the outbreak by the MSPP 
just two days later, MSF took an advisory and support role – supporting the MSPP as well 
as other actors. In addition to the huge numbers of cases directly treated by MSF, the 
organisation had an important impact in terms of technical support.   
 
Medical coordinators were consulted for the definition of the national protocol, and 
advised on strategies. MSF treatment protocol was approved as the national MSPP one. 
Fifty-three percent of all cases nationwide were treated by MSF teams, including 15% by 
OCG (between October 2010 and February 2011). In addition, a number of actors 
received training and technical support from OCG and other MSF sections. MSF inter-
sectional collaboration was judged effective, relevant and efficient.  
 
(3)  Insufficient risk assessment and preparedness for cholera 
The risk of an epidemic in the Haitian water and sanitation context, and after a major 
natural disaster, had been downplayed in Haiti. OCG (like other sections within MSF, and 
like the government itself) had no real preparedness plan or activities for Haiti, and had 
no pre-positioned supplies, either locally or in the region, for cholera and other 
epidemic-prone diarrhoeal diseases. Different factors explain this, including the 
conclusion of humanitarian actors that ‘epidemic disease was unlikely’, and that 
overstating its risk could lead to the misallocation of resources and promote needless 
fear. In addition, cholera had been absent from Haiti for 100 years before October 2010.  
 
Inside MSF, there was disagreement about the likelihood of cholera breaking out. One 
cholera kit was pre-positioned in Port-au-Prince due to an individual’s decision. There 
had been a SMART test (a rapid test for cholera) in Port-au-Prince until September 2010, 
but it was sent back to HQ because of the near-expiry date and was not replaced. 
 
(4)  Rural decentralised strategy implemented effectively but with delay 
The rural activities started around six weeks after the start of the CTC and CTU activities 
in the Nord department. Considering the scope of the emergency inside the city, and the 19 
 
limited resources available at that time (of both HR and supplies), it is hard to imagine 
how an earlier start would have been possible. 
 
The strategy was to implement a widespread network of CTUs and CTCs plus oral 
rehydration points (ORPs) in the community. The mode of deployment changed many 
times, depending on the phase of the epidemic and on collaboration with other partners. 
Over time it shifted from direct and rapid implementation to increased supervision and 
training in advance of the handover to the MSPP. For more details see 3.2.2. 
 
(5)  Reasonable balance between preventive and curative activities  
In a smaller outbreak, MSF would be as focused on trying to break transmission as on 
treatment, carrying out community awareness and education efforts, chlorinating water, 
and so on. In the Haiti situation, however, it was necessary to decide how to be most 
effective with the available capacities. Other MSF sections mainly focused on serving the 
most severe cases in urban areas, while pushing other actors to fill in the gaps elsewhere. 
OCG successfully carried out most of the aforementioned comprehensive prevention 
activities in both urban and rural areas. The initial efforts could have been timelier, with 
the allocation of more resources and a more rapid deployment. After the initial stage (six 
weeks) OCG had achieved a reasonable balance between preventive and curative 
activities.  
 
(6)  Social mobilisation as key to intervention and rapid scale-up 
Timely and appropriate communications efforts, which concentrated on local media 
(allowing international communications to be managed from Port-au-Prince), together 
with immediate IEC and health promotion activities, were key factors in the success of 
this response. Despite initial public consternation, these measures helped gain 
acceptance and utilisation of services, and allowed rapid intervention and scale-up. 
Thanks to the existing health promotion and IEC5 capacities in Léogâne, expertise and  
resources were quickly made available for both the Nord department and for Léogâne. 
For more details see 3.2.1. 
 
(7)  Overall good case management, but space for improvement  
Medical case management by OCG was appropriate and followed agreed standards 
(average CFR <2% in MSF-supported health structures). However, issues that affected 
the quality of the case management were: 
o  Intra-osseous drill for children and adults (when IV access is not possible) was 
judged useful, but was introduced late in Haiti.  
o  An over-use of IV fluids has been identified through analysis of epidemiological 
data and through interviews.  
o  Zinc was added to the treatment protocol for children,6 but with some delay. 
Medical staff are not fully aware of the usefulness of zinc supplementation in 
diarrhoea control.  
o  Cholera kits had not been updated and were therefore not adapted to the needs 
(eg no zinc, no paediatric drips, no erythromycin). 
o  Misunderstandings were observed among medical staff (and between different 
MSF sections) regarding the level of dehydration, administration mode (IV or 
oral), and treatment plan. This leads the evaluator to question the usefulness of 
Plan A, B, C classifications.  
                                                 
5 OCG uses the term ’IEC’ to describe all social mobilisation and health promotion activities. The evaluator 
considers this terminology inadequate, as it downplays what social mobilisation/ health promotion is about and 
the range of activities that can go with it. 
 
6 Zinc supplementation for diarrhoea treatment is evidence-based and a WHO recommendation since 2005. Zinc 
reduces mortality in children, reduces admissions to hospital for diarrhoea, and reduces the duration and severity 
of treated episodes. 20 
 
 
(8)  Innovative management of cholera in pregnant women  
Pregnant women received special attention in OCG-supported CTUs and CTCs. A new 
protocol for cholera in pregnancy evolved, which led to good outcomes. Such success has 
not been documented elsewhere before. The strategy used in Léogâne was also adopted 
by the OCG team in the Nord department (though has still to be adopted by other MSF 
sections). 
 
The protocol for managing pregnant women with cholera was innovative and 
implemented for the first time in Haiti. The approach was judged simple, feasible in an 
emergency context and cost-efficient, especially in term of lives-saved for mothers and 
babies. For more details see 3.2.3. 
 
(9)  Much work, but no comprehensive strategy on water and sanitation  
There was much activity in the area of water and sanitation, with a clear focus on 
ensuring safety and hygiene around cholera treatment facilities. MSF WatSan teams 
played an important role in training and providing support to other actors.  
 
In terms of water treatment, there was a plethora of approaches to chlorination at  
household and community levels. Multiple chlorination products with different dosages 
and dilution methods (utilised by various MSF sections, NGOs and the UN) confused the 
population and had a negative impact. No harmonisation was achieved, a situation which 
was still unchanged in July 2011.  
 
Within OCG an overall WatSan strategy for community outreach was lacking. There were 
not enough experienced WatSan people who could have coached and coordinated 
outreach teams. It is also important to distinguish between staff needs for curative 
activities (inside CTUs and CTCs) and staff needs for preventive activities (outside CTUs 
and CTCs). The WatSan officer responsible for the prevention activities was too often 
absorbed by demanding CTC/CTU strategy. This affected the timeliness of the 
implementation of a preventive WatSan strategy outside CTCs and CTUs.  
 
(10)  Innovative faeces/excreta management 
Faeces/excreta management in CTUs and CTCs was mainly done using pits, but this was 
not possible everywhere due to the high water table. Therefore in some CTUs (eg Bravo 
and Cap Haïtien), faeces had to be stored in large tanks until a solution for disposal was 
found. An innovative process was implemented by OCG to treat and dispose of faeces 
using physiochemical treatment with hydrated lime (this was piloted by OCA in 
collaboration with Brighton University).  
 
(11)  Inadequate technical briefings before departure increases pressure in the field 
The extensive briefing and training of expats (especially first missioners) is considered 
important to ease pressure on experienced staff in the field.  
 
The first wave of staff, including those on their first mission, was all too often sent 
directly to the field, without receiving a face-to-face briefing in Geneva. Briefing in the 
field takes up valuable time in an emergency, and often had to be kept basic. At HQ level,   
efforts were made to conduct special briefing sessions in Geneva (partly in collaboration 
with MSF in Paris), but due to many practical challenges (expats not passing through 
Geneva, timing of departures, line managers lacking the time to conduct the briefings), 
these sessions were irregular and insufficient. Only at a later stage (after January 2011) 
were additional, experienced staff hired by the medical department to help with the 
medical briefings and debriefings at HQ. On the field level, the deployment of a ’flying 
training team’ to help prepare for opening new CTUs and CTCs proved successful.  21 
 
 
(12)  Underuse of laboratory services to understand parallel infections 
WHO and MSF recommendations for use of laboratory confirmation in cholera outbreaks 
were not implemented (there was no lab use in the middle of the outbreak, and no 
regular AST testing before March 2010, etc). 
  
The increasing proportion of children being brought to most CTUs and CTCs during the 
five-month period indicates the presence of diarrhoeal diseases other than cholera. In 
the absence of regular biological confirmation of a sample of cases throughout the 
outbreak, treatment protocols were not adapted to cover possible other bacterial causes 
of diarrhoea, such as shigellosis. 
 
(13)  Appropriate collection and relevant use of epidemiological data, but disagreement 
on ambitions  
Epidemiological data collection (data managers in CTCs and CTUs) and analysis (OCG 
epidemiologists) were globally appropriate in regards to the emergency context. Even if 
OCG data included only cases who presented in CTUs, CTCs or ORPs (so representing just 
the ’tip of the iceberg’), they were effectively used by field teams to map cases, plan and 
orientate their activities. Epicentre’s intersectional epidemiologist positions were of 
great use and ensured smooth coordination and collaboration between MSF and the 
MSPP.  
 
Within OCG, there is disagreement about MSF’s role in epidemiological surveillance in 
Haiti, especially related to data collection for rural areas outside MSF structures. Some 
believe that MSF should enlarge its role in surveillance to be able to better map the 
evolution of the outbreak in the community and so intervene more efficiently. Others 
think it is far beyond MSF’s mandate to do this, and that the MSPP and WHO should keep 
the lead in surveillance for sustainability and efficiency purposes.  
 
The evaluator believes epidemiological surveillance in rural areas (outside MSF health 
structures) is, for the moment, far beyond MSF’s mandate and current capacities. Instead 
MSF should work collaboratively with the MSPP and WHO to share data and refine their 
mapping to better orientate strategic decisions. 
 
(14)  Clear exit strategy in Nord department in collaboration with the MSPP 
Though the issue of exit is beyond the scope of this evaluation, we will touch on it here, 
as the efforts underway could be directly observed during the field visit. OCG ended its 
intervention in the north in September 2011 and has handed over activities to the MSPP. 
Though it was an obvious challenge for the teams to let go of the responsibility for high 
quality medical care, the efforts made from the beginning to train, involve and 
communicate with other partners, primarily the MSPP, have yielded very good results in 
terms of their capacity to manage future cases. With additional funding, the MSPP has 
taken over a majority of MSF’s locally-hired staff and continues a large part of MSF’s 
activities. MSF did not pay health staff according to MSPP salaries, which later caused the 
MSPP some difficulties with regard to the handover.  
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(15)  Vaccination not implemented as a preventive activity 
Vaccination was not used in Haiti as a preventive measure to control the outbreak. The 
main reasons were: 
o  No pre-qualified vaccines existed at the start of the outbreak, but today (October 
2011) pre-qualified vaccines exist . 
o  The manufacturer’s stock of vaccines was not big enough to cover the needs in 
Haiti. 
o  Vaccine use would have required a lot of effort in terms of health education and 
resources, as with an efficiency of only 60-70%, an already sceptical Haitian 
population could easily have lost trust in MSF’s capacity to respond effectively to 
the outbreak.  
o  The use of the vaccine, with its known weaknesses (efficiency, never used on a 
large scale to control a countrywide epidemic etc) could easily have exacerbated 
a tense situation and led to security issues amongst a population already 
suspicious of foreign humanitarian aid. 23 
 
 
 
3.4  Take-up of previous ‘lessons learned’  
Many of the key findings emerging from previous evaluations of cholera outbreak response (eg 
OCG’s 2007 Evaluation report of epidemic response, and MSF’s intersectional evaluation reports 
following outbreaks in Angola in 2006 and Zimbabwe in 2009) apply again for Haiti. 
 
There are a number of ‘lessons learned’ and recommendations, confirmed by the experience in 
Haiti, which should be revisited. 
Table 5: Implementation status of previous recommendations:  
  Source  Implementation status 
(Oct 2011) 
·  Missions should be better 
prepared for epidemics, ie 
preparedness plans and 
emergency stocks are to be 
checked and updated regularly. 
·  MSF-OCG 2007 
Evaluation report,  
epidemic response 
·  Angola 2006 cholera 
outbreak evaluation 
report, MSF all 
sections 
No e-prep for diarrhoeal 
diseases in Haiti (true of all 
MSF sections). 
 
NB: One cholera kit was 
available for OCG. 
·  Expatriates should be carefully 
trained and briefed at 
headquarters beforehand.  
·  Adequate training for all 
expatriates and national staff must 
be organised at an early stage.  
 
·  MSF-OCG 2007  
·  Zimbabwe 2009  
·  Angola 2006  
 
Not done for cholera in Haiti 
on a standard basis and at an 
early stage (for the first 
wave, Oct to Dec 2010). 
·  Ready-to-use training modules 
(for cholera, meningitis) could 
help to quickly organise short 
training sessions in the country. 
·  A one-day cholera training session 
has been developed by OCBA 
 
·  MSF-OCG 2007  
·  Zimbabwe 2009 
·  Angola 2006 
No standardised ready-to-
use module training in MSF-
OCG exists 
·  Update cholera guidelines 
 
·  Zimbabwe 2009 
·  Angola 2006 
Updated guideline not 
published (version 2004) 
 
·  Add zinc to MSF cholera kits and 
to treatment protocols where 
appropriate 
·  Zimbabwe 2009  
 
Zinc not yet available in 
cholera kits.  
Addition of zinc to MSF 
treatment protocols was 
forgotten at early stage of 
the intervention. It has since 
been added. 
 
·  Investigate adaptation to 
treatment protocols for 
malnourished cholera patients 
and cholera patients with HIV 
 
·  Zimbabwe 2009   Not implemented on a 
standard basis in Haiti (ad 
hoc only). Malnutrition is an 
issue in Haiti. 
·  Expatriates with experience of 
treating cholera should be sent as 
quickly as possible to the field in 
an emergency. 
·  Angola 2006  
 
Done for first wave of 
deployment, but significant 
lack of experienced staff for 
the second wave (majority 
were first mission). 24 
 
 
·  In order to retain a pool of 
experienced expatriates, 
continual training and monitoring 
of current knowledge, and 
experience of the HR pool, should 
be reinforced. 
 
·  Angola 2006  
 
No continual training and 
monitoring; general issues 
with HR management. 
·  MSF should be responsible for the 
hiring and remuneration of 
national staff. If national staff are 
provided by the MoH, MSF should 
pay incentives from the first day 
that the MoH staff work in a health 
structure run by MSF. 
·  Angola 2006  
 
Done in Haiti, but MSPP 
salary scale not respected so 
created huge difficulties for 
the handover to MSPP in 
Nord department. 
ORP and ‘ORS light’ points 
were run on a voluntary 
basis (non-paid) by 
community members. This 
was judged appropriate in 
the Haitian context. 
 
·  In order to optimise a cholera 
intervention, curative and 
preventive strategies have to be 
considered together. Tasks for 
both strategies have to be clearly 
described and human resources 
independently dedicated to each 
of the strategies.  
 
·  Angola 2006  HR (WatSan outside 
CTC/CTU, IEC, comms) were 
absorbed by curative 
activities at the beginning. 
Field staff had to advocate/ 
negotiate with HQ to get the 
necessary support. 
·  Preventive water, hygiene and 
sanitation results can be achieved 
in an emergency context (short 
timeframe) with targeted activities 
based on mapping of cases and 
environmental conditions.  
·  Angola 2006  Ad hoc strategy in Haiti, and 
not standardised in all sites. 
Bucket chlorination not 
implemented as a standard. 
Management of dead bodies 
outside CTU/CTC was an 
issue (MSPP role? MSF role 
to support?) 
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4   Recommendations 
Here are the recommendations to further improve OCG response to cholera and overall 
diarrhoeal diseases in the future: 
 
(1) Ensure balance between PREVENTIVE and CURATIVE strategies 
Curative and preventive response activities should be implemented by two different 
teams, but following complementary strategies, under a common coordination 
mechanism. Each team should have its own budget, HR, strategies,etc. Curative and 
preventive strategies should be started at the same time in order to have a real impact on 
cholera.  
 
(2) Strengthen epidemiological capacity to monitor and orientate response 
Epidemiologists should be sent to the field together with the first medical staff to ensure 
timely implementation of a surveillance system based on CTC/CTU/ORP data. This will 
enable a dynamic “approximate” mapping of the outbreak. A pool of epidemiologists 
should be formalised within OCG to respond to this strategic need. 
 
(3) Define a clear WATSAN strategy outside the CTC/CTU 
In order to have a real impact on prevention, OCG must define a global WatSan strategy 
outside the CTC/CTU and invest accordingly.  
On field level, two separate WatSan teams should be provided for each of the two response 
axes - curative and preventive - with distinct terms of reference. 
o  In a big outbreak, WatSan coordination and supervision at field level must be 
strengthened. A WatSan advisor as part of the emergency coordination team could 
ensure consistency for integrated WatSan activities. 
o  At HQ level, one proposition is to have a stronger Watsan capacity and consequently 
reposition/reorganise the service.  
o  At the minimum, WatSan technical activities for each cholera outbreak should include: 
o  Bucket chlorination by dedicated staff/volunteers at water sources; 
o  (And/or/then) chlorine distribution, always combined with training and IEC on 
how to chlorinate home water for individuals; 
o  In order to address the danger of markets as sites of cholera transmission, MSF should 
include safe market-related activities (latrines, hand-washing points, hygiene 
education, control of water sold in the markets etc) in its Watsan strategy and/or 
lobby for other actors to address these needs.  
 
(4) Develop guidelines for social mobilisation in a cholera response 
The Haiti experience has proved the usefulness of social mobilisation and health 
promotion in outbreak control. OCG should commit itself to a social mobilisation/health 
promotion strategy and develop capacities accordingly. A draft protocol has been 
proposed, based on the Haiti experience, and should be built upon and finalised. 
 26 
 
(5) Invest in staff preparation and training for cholera response 
o  A modular system would improve the preparation of staff going to work in a cholera 
outbreak; this should consist of (self-acquired) theory and background information, 
specific briefing by an expert, and on-the-spot coaching and supervision.  
o  A technical tool for self-learning could be developed (e-learning or not).  
o  For briefings and debriefings, additional support staff should be hired at HQ level; 
these staff would closely cooperate with line managers.  
o  A training coordinator position for emergency interventions should be created.  
o  Training sessions and/or annual refresher courses on cholera (and other subjects?) 
should be considered for potential teams. The aim should be to ensure a consistent 
pool of trained or experienced staff. 
 
(6) Use laboratory services to monitor and react to outbreak dynamics 
Biological surveillance of residual cases is essential to understand and follow a cholera 
outbreak. OCG operations should follow a systematic method on how, when, why and  
which tests (rapid tests or gold standards) to use for laboratory confirmation in cholera 
outbreaks (including confirmation of outbreak, evolution of outbreak, end of outbreak, 
antibiotic susceptibility testing, concomitant outbreaks of other diarrhoeal diseases etc).  
 
(7) Prepare to use vaccination as part of a prevention strategy 
The cholera vaccine was used for the first time in 1997. There is a need for MSF to go 
forward and start using the vaccine as part of an overall preventive strategy during large 
or medium scale outbreaks. As the current main issue is the low level of stock, OCG should 
think about stockpiling the vaccine and using it in a reactive mode in a future outbreak. 
Two doses are needed, which will not be realistic under certain field conditions, so 
innovative ways of using the vaccine will need to be found. 
 
(8) Improve specific issues in case management 
o  Intra-osseous drill for children and adults should be added to the cholera kit. 
o  MSF should adhere to the recommended use of zinc. It should be added to the cholera 
kit and to the treatment protocol, and its use explained to medical staff.  
o  Plan A, B and C classifications should be reviewed, as they are misleading. A simplified 
protocol should be decided instead. 
 
(9) Contribute to the revision of MSF cholera guidelines  
OCG’s innovations and experiences in Haiti should be shared and integrated into the 
revised MSF cholera guidelines, specifically the new protocols for pregnant women and  
for the management of excreta and the specific lessons learned on IEC, communications 
and WatSan. The following should also be considered:  
o  Describe the WatSan activities to be implemented outside health structures.  
o  Describe possible strategies for rural settings, using the Haiti experience.  
o  Provide a range of already field-tested IEC materials, including posters, 
pamphlets, radio messages etc. These should be in English, French, Spanish and  
Portuguese, possibly on a CD rom.  
o  Add innovative IEC and local communication methods, for example using SMS to 
send text messages by mobile phone.  
 
It is a sad fact that today, in Haiti, more than one million people remain homeless. Shelter is 
vastly inadequate, and water and sanitation services still fail to meet the needs of the people. 
Together they continue to create the conditions for future outbreaks of disease. In this context, 
cholera is unlikely to disappear from Haiti. Not only will cholera be endemic in the country, but 
epidemics are likely to recur. Haiti – and MSF – must be prepared to respond to such outbreaks 
in the future.  
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6  Annexes 
6.1   Terms of Reference 
 
Review of the  
OCG response to cholera in Haiti,  
Oct 2010 – March 2011 
 
Commissioned by: ................ Operational and medical director, OCG  
Starting date: .......................... 26 June 2011  
Duration: ................................... Three months 
 
Terms of reference elaborated by: Iza Ciglenecki, Eric Comte, Annick Antierens, Monica Rull, Lauren 
Ligozat, Sabine Kampmüller, Anneli Eriksson (OCB)   
 
CONTEXT 
 
After the disastrous earthquake in Haiti in January 2010, cholera appeared in Haiti for the first 
time for almost a century in October 2010. Almost 300,000 people fell ill and more than 4,500 
died.  
 
MSF had treated more than 110,000 patients by mid-February 2011. OCG was running a 
significant part of this response in Cap Haïtien and Léogâne.  
 
This was one of the biggest interventions in response to cholera that MSF has ever been involved 
in. A number of new strategies were applied and should be evaluated and documented for the 
future.  
 
OBJECTIVE and PURPOSE 
 
The objective of the evaluation is to provide an analysis of the overall effectiveness and 
appropriateness of different strategies used.  
 
The evaluation process will ensure sharing and documentation of the main lessons learned for 
future cholera interventions.  
 
KEY EVALUATION QUESTIONS 
i)  How appropriate were MSF’s chosen strategies for responding to the nationwide 
epidemic in different settings (urban and rural)?  
o  Describe strategies and compare them 
o  Describe constraints and challenges in various settings 
o  How was epidemiological information used for planning of activities and lobbying?  
o  Briefly describe the specific experience of treating pregnant women  
o  Consider input & resources per strategy 
o  Analyse main epidemiological outcomes  
ii)  What were the main lessons learned?  
o  Draw from capitalisations done by medical,  WatSan, IEC and comms specialists 
The MSF cholera guidelines as well as the WHO guidelines will serve as a reference in the 
evaluation process.  
 
EXPECTED RESULTS and INTENDED USE OF THE EVALUATION 
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o  Describe epidemic in the regions where OCG (OCB?) was working 
o  Description, comparison and analysis of different strategies (set-up, partners, allocation of 
resources etc) 
o  Analysis/comparison of main medical outcomes (AR?, no of cases treated, CFR, etc) 
o  Description/analysis of factors influencing effectiveness (staff qualifications/training 
etc) 
o  Description of preventive measures in each location  
o  (Global) description of partnerships, advocacy activities 
o  Description of the experience treating pregnant women 
o  Summary of main lessons learned 
o  Recommendations for possible changes to the cholera guidelines and generally for future 
interventions 
 
The outcomes of a retrospective mortality study (by Epicentre) will be used for analysing 
community outcomes in relation to the MSF intervention.  
 
PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EVALUATION  
 
Desk study/analysis of available epidemiological/outcome data for different locations.  
Interviews with staff, ops managers etc. 
Field visit to key locations, interview with partners, national staff etc.  
 
RECOMMENDED DOCUMENTATION 
 
Final report of the independent panel of experts on the cholera outbreak in Haiti 
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6.2   List of people interviewed or consulted 
Name  Organisation  Means  Date 
114 MSF staff with 
58 responding 
All OCG staff involved in cholera response 
·  Staff from Cap Haïtien project 
·  Staff from Léogâne project 
·  Léogâne regular team involved in 
cholera 
·  HQ staff, who had worked in the field 
during the outbreak 
·  Regular coordination staff involved in 
cholera response 
·  Selected MSF Epicentre staff 
 
Web survey  From 
24/06/2010 
to 
12/07/2011 
8 MSF HQ staff 
lessons learned 
workshop, 
conducted by 
Sabine 
Kampmueller 
OCG HQ staff involved in cholera response 
·  Guillaume Queyras 
·  Helmi Mekaoui 
·  Esther Sterk 
·  Annick Antierens 
·  Aurélie Lachant 
·  Véronique Mulloni 
·  Naoufel Driri 
·  Sebastien 
 
Workshop  19/07/2011 
in OCG office, 
Geneva 
Dominique Legros  WHO HQ/DCE, Geneva and MSF OCG Board 
member  
Phone  16/06/2011 
and 
20/07/2011 
Pat Drury  Project manager, GOARN, Alert and Response 
Operations, GAR/ARO, WHO, Geneva 
Face to face  29/07/2011 
Miriam Henkens   Medical Coordinator, MSF International, 
consulted in Geneva 
Face to face  29/07/2011 
Pilar Ramon Pardo  Advisor, Alert and Response and Epidemic 
Diseases, Regional Office for the Americas, Pan- 
American Sanitary Bureau, WHO PAHO, 
Washington, consulted in Geneva. 
Face to face  29/07/2011 
Kate Alberti  MSF Epicentre, Paris  Phone  11/07/2011 
Katharina Resch  MD, worked in rural CTC, Nord department  Phone  15/07/2011 
Guillaume Queyras  Log, MSF OCG, Geneva  Face to face  12/07/2011 
Ludovic   Log, based Cap Haïtien and Léogâne  Face to face  12/07/2011 
Anne Perocheau  WHO Consultant for evaluation response 
cholera  
Phone  15/07/2011 
Oifa Bouriachi  Adj. RP, Emergency cell, MSF OCG, Geneva  Face to face  22/07/2011 
Helmi Mekaoui  Adj. RP, Emergency cell, MSF OCG, Geneva  Face to face  19/07/2011 
and 
21/07/2011 
Iza Ciglenecki  Emergency programmes manager, Emergency 
cell, MSF OCG, Geneva 
Face to face 
and phone 
08/07/2011 
and 12/09 
Laurent Ligozat  Associate director, Op Dep, MSF OCG, Geneva  Face to face  21/07/2011 
Eric Comte  Medical director, Med Dep, MSF OCG, Geneva  Face to face  20/07/2011 
and 15/09 
Esther Sterk  Med dept, trop med expert in OCG, Geneva  Face to face  11/07/2011 
Monica Rull  RP, MSF OCG, Geneva  Face to face  11/07/2011 
Florian Teutsch  WatSan, MSF Vienna, Austria  Phone  18/07/2011 
Hughes Robert  Medical coordinator, Northern dept (Cap  Phone  15/07/2011 32 
 
Haïtien) 
Aurélie Lachant  Communications officer (emergency), MSF 
OCG, Geneva 
Face to face  13/07/2011 
Kenneth Lavelle  Adj. RP, cell 2, MSF OCG, Geneva  Face to face  20/07/2011 
Gerard Beddock  Head  of mission, Port-au-Prince, Haiti  Face to face  25/07/2011 
Cecile Bassi Foulon  Medical coordinator, Port-au-Prince, Haiti  Face to face  25/07/2011 
Bruno Bellaton  Flying log WatSan, Nord dept (Cap Haïtien) , 
Léogâne, Haiti 
Face to face  25/07/2011 
Tatiana Kourline   IEC coordinator, Léogâne, Haiti  Face to face  27/07/2011 
Baptistin Francois  IEC supervisor, Léogâne, Haiti  Face to face  27/07/2011 
Sheila Fortune  IEC supervisor, Léogâne, Haiti  Face to face  27/07/2011 
Luckenson Jean 
Francois 
IEC supervisor, Nord dept (Cap Haïtien) and 
also in Léogâne, Haiti 
Face to face  27 and 
28/07/2011 
Helen Rymshaw  Emergency coordinator, Nord dpt (Cap 
Haïtien) and from April 2011 field coordinator, 
Léogâne, Haiti 
Face to face  27 and 28 
/07/2011 
Chery  National medical doctor (CTC Brache, CTU, 
Léogâne container hospital), Léogâne, Haiti 
Face to face  28/07/2011 
Marie Tesse   Nurse, Léogâne, Haiti  Face to face  28/07/2011 
Marleen de 
Tavernier 
Emergency MedCo, Port-au-Prince, Haiti (now 
with Save the Children in Léogâne) 
Face to face  28/07/2011 
Gaelle Breteau  Midwife, Léogâne, Haiti  Face to face  28/07/2011 
Basette Gertoli  Log  WatSan, CTC Brache, Léogâne, Haiti  Face to face  29/07/2011 
IEC officers (9 
persons) 
Nord dpt (Cap Haïtien), Haiti  IEC Meeting, 
face to face 
29/07/2011 
Dr Julius  Medical doctor, CTC Bravo, Nord dpt (Cap 
Haïtien), Haiti 
Face to face  29/07/2011 
Dominique Elius  Log WatSan (in outreach tem, for CTC/CTU and  
WatSan trainer), Nord dpt (Cap Haïtien), Haiti 
Face to face  30/07/2011 
Dr Benson  Medical doctor (CTC Fort St Michel) and 
medical in IEC outreach team, Nord dpt 
Face to face  30/07/2011 
Laurence De 
Vignes 
Field coordinator, Nord dpt  Face to face  30/07/2011 
01/08/2011 
Linda  Nurse, CTU Dondon, Nord dpt  Face to face  01/08/2011 
Pierre Reynald  Dondon HC administrator, Nord dpt  Face to face  01/08/2011 
Durosier Frisner  Director, Dondon town hall, Nord dpt  Face to face  01/08/2011 
Ernst Robert Jasin  Director, MSPP, Cap Haïtien  Face to face  01/08/2011 
Yannick Emboise  OXFAM hygiene promotion, Cap Haïtien  Face to face  01/08/2011 
Ulrich Saint Just  Medical doctor (CTC sports centre), medical 
supervisor, and IEC supervisor, Cap Haïtien 
Face to face  01/08/2011 
Aurora Revuelta  Medical coordinator, OCA, Port-au-Prince  Face to face  02/08/2011 
Virginie Garat  HR , E-cell, MSF HQ, Geneva  Face to face  14/09/2011 
Veronique Mulloni  WatSan MSF HQ, Geneva  Face to face  12/09/2011 
Dr Mike  Medical doctor, Staff Health, MSF Geneva  Face to face  14/09/2011 
Hugues Juillerat  Health promotion specialist, MSF Haiti   Face to face  15/09/2011 
Matthieu Bichet  MedCo, Haiti  Phone  26/09/2011 
Anja Wolz  Emergency coodinator, Cap Haïtien  Not possible  Not feasible 33 
 
6.3   Web survey results  
Table 6 : Summary of the anonymous web survey participation 
  Number 
Total no of staff from MSF HR data + Epicentre staff  142 
Total no of staff with email addresses  128 
Total no of staff with valid email addresses  114 
Staff who responded  58 
 
Final response rate was 50.1% (58/114). One-third of these had previous experience in a 
cholera response.  
 
The vast majority of respondents (90%) considered the MSF response (totally or almost totally) 
appropriate. When asked more specifically about appropriateness in urban and rural settings, it 
was rated much more positively for urban settings, with 86 %, compared to 68 % for rural 
settings.  
 
The three main areas of work considered as strengths in the MSF response: 
•  Case management: no of patients treated, reactivity setting up CTC/CTU etc. 
•  Logistics and supplies  
•  Epidemiology and surveillance. 
•  Involvement of the community (Com+IEC)  
 
The main suggestions for improvement in the next three years (’weaknesses’): 
•  Human resources (experience +/- no) 
•  Training /briefing (pre-departure or on-the-spot) and debriefing (post-mission) 
•  WatSan (not Log) 
•  Cholera guidelines/protocols  
•  HQ￿Field decision making process 
•  Involvement with other partners  
•   
Other issues emerging from the comments of respondents:  
•  Care of geriatric patients forgotten 
•  Funeral practices not tackled 
 
Possible solutions proposed by respondents:  
•  Dedicated HR for preventive activities 
•  More experienced RH (with management skills)  
•  New cholera guidelines or standard tools: med, WatSan, social mob.  
•  Clear standardised command line for decision making between HQ and field 
coordinator in emergency 
•  More WatSan staff and resources, and greater WatSan role in decision making￿ 
separation between WatSan and Log; need for a WatSan coordinator in field. More space 
to retain and develop core team of experienced WatSan staff in the field and at HQ 
•  Early set up of training unit (HQ+ field). More support from HR department to send 
trainers during the initial stage of the outbreak 
•  Specialised standardisd training “kits” 
•  Be more humble in decisions/ interventions/ communications with other organisations. 
Quote “MSF doesn't know everything”.  
 
WatSan has been identified by 80% of the respondents as a huge priority for OCG to look at in 
the near future. Involvement of the community was not seen as a major weakness by 62% of 
the respondents. Example quote: 
“This was not the main weakness, as the involvement of the community was the core of the strategy 
and was pushed to its extreme by OCG team in northern Haiti”. 3
4
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C
 
c
a
p
a
c
i
t
i
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
m
o
b
i
l
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
r
o
u
n
d
 
c
h
o
l
e
r
a
.
 
·
 
M
a
i
n
t
a
i
n
i
n
g
 
a
 
s
a
f
e
 
a
n
d
 
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
 
f
o
r
 
r
e
f
e
r
r
a
l
 
o
f
 
s
e
v
e
r
e
 
c
a
s
e
s
 
t
o
 
c
h
o
l
e
r
a
 
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
 
c
e
n
t
r
e
s
 
(
‘
O
R
S
 
l
i
g
h
t
’
)
.
 
·
 
I
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
v
e
 
c
a
r
e
 
f
o
r
 
p
r
e
g
n
a
n
t
 
w
o
m
e
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
c
h
o
l
e
r
a
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
.
 
·
 
W
a
t
S
a
n
 
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
t
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
p
l
a
c
e
s
.
 
 
 3
5
 
 
R
u
r
a
l
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
 
·
 
S
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
 
o
f
 
O
R
P
s
 
r
u
n
 
b
y
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
y
 
v
o
l
u
n
t
e
e
r
s
 
(
M
S
F
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
d
 
l
o
g
i
s
t
i
c
s
,
 
s
u
p
p
l
i
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
,
 
b
u
t
 
n
o
 
s
a
l
a
r
y
)
 
w
i
t
h
 
m
o
b
i
l
e
 
M
S
F
 
o
u
t
r
e
a
c
h
 
t
e
a
m
 
i
n
 
c
h
a
r
g
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
i
o
n
.
 
·
 
T
h
e
 
O
R
P
s
 
t
o
o
k
 
c
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
P
l
a
n
 
A
 
c
a
s
e
s
,
 
m
e
a
n
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
y
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
 
r
e
l
i
e
v
e
d
 
C
T
U
s
 
a
n
d
 
C
T
C
s
 
o
f
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
3
0
%
 
o
f
 
c
a
s
e
s
.
 
 
·
 
S
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
 
o
f
 
‘
O
R
S
 
l
i
g
h
t
’
:
 
o
n
e
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
y
 
v
o
l
u
n
t
e
e
r
 
w
i
t
h
 
n
o
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
b
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
 
o
r
 
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
M
a
i
n
 
r
o
l
e
:
 
r
e
f
e
r
r
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
 
p
r
o
m
o
t
i
o
n
/
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
O
R
S
.
 
·
 
I
m
p
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
t
h
a
t
 
i
n
 
L
é
o
g
â
n
e
 
m
o
r
e
 
p
e
o
p
l
e
 
c
a
m
e
 
d
i
r
e
c
t
l
y
 
t
o
 
C
T
U
s
 
a
n
d
 
C
T
C
s
 
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
 
b
e
i
n
g
 
r
e
f
e
r
r
e
d
 
b
y
 
‘
O
R
S
 
l
i
g
h
t
’
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
,
 
b
e
c
a
u
s
e
 
o
f
 
s
t
i
g
m
a
 
w
h
e
n
 
t
r
e
a
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
n
e
i
g
h
b
o
u
r
h
o
o
d
.
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
 
·
 
A
l
m
o
s
t
 
n
o
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
m
e
d
i
c
a
l
 
a
c
t
o
r
s
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
e
m
e
r
g
e
n
c
y
 
p
h
a
s
e
 
e
x
c
e
p
t
 
t
h
e
 
C
u
b
a
n
 
M
e
d
i
c
a
l
 
B
r
i
g
a
d
e
s
.
 
·
 
S
e
v
e
r
a
l
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
a
n
d
 
c
h
u
r
c
h
-
r
u
n
 
h
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
t
r
e
a
t
i
n
g
 
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
s
 
–
 
i
n
 
r
u
r
a
l
 
a
r
e
a
s
 
M
S
F
 
m
a
i
n
l
y
 
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
t
h
e
s
e
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
s
 
o
r
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
e
d
 
C
T
U
s
 
l
i
n
k
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
m
.
 
·
 
A
s
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
a
c
t
o
r
s
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
i
n
g
l
y
 
g
o
t
 
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
d
 
i
n
 
c
h
o
l
e
r
a
,
 
O
C
G
’
s
 
f
o
c
u
s
 
m
o
v
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
m
o
s
t
 
s
e
v
e
r
e
 
c
a
s
e
s
.
 
 
·
 
A
 
m
a
j
o
r
 
a
d
v
a
n
t
a
g
e
 
i
n
 
L
é
o
g
â
n
e
 
w
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
e
-
e
x
i
s
t
e
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
h
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
e
x
p
e
r
t
s
,
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
w
e
r
e
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
 
u
s
e
d
 
t
o
 
k
i
c
k
 
o
f
f
 
o
r
 
t
e
c
h
n
i
c
a
l
l
y
 
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
 
t
h
e
 
c
h
o
l
e
r
a
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
.
 
T
h
i
s
 
a
p
p
l
i
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
I
E
C
 
t
e
a
m
,
 
w
h
o
 
i
m
m
e
d
i
a
t
e
l
y
 
s
h
i
f
t
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
 
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
 
t
o
 
c
h
o
l
e
r
a
 
p
r
e
p
a
r
e
d
n
e
s
s
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
d
 
H
R
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
N
o
r
d
 
d
e
p
a
r
t
m
e
n
t
.
 
 
T
h
i
s
 
a
l
s
o
 
h
a
d
 
a
n
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
 
o
n
 
m
a
t
e
r
n
i
t
y
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
,
 
a
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
s
t
a
f
f
 
t
o
 
a
n
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
e
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
t
e
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
 
c
a
r
e
 
f
o
r
 
p
r
e
g
n
a
n
t
 
w
o
m
e
n
.
 
M
e
n
t
a
l
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
 
s
t
a
f
f
 
a
l
s
o
 
c
a
m
e
 
u
p
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
 
p
r
o
p
o
s
a
l
 
f
o
r
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
i
n
g
 
p
s
y
c
h
o
l
o
g
i
c
a
l
 
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
 
t
o
 
c
h
o
l
e
r
a
 
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
b
e
r
e
a
v
e
d
 
f
a
m
i
l
i
e
s
.
 
 
D
e
a
d
 
b
o
d
y
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
 
W
h
i
l
e
 
M
S
F
’
s
 
t
h
e
o
r
e
t
i
c
a
l
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
 
i
s
 
t
o
 
e
n
s
u
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
f
e
 
r
e
m
o
v
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
b
u
r
i
a
l
 
o
f
 
d
e
a
d
 
b
o
d
i
e
s
,
 
t
h
i
s
 
w
a
s
 
n
o
t
 
f
u
l
l
y
 
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
c
u
l
t
u
r
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
t
e
n
s
i
o
n
s
.
 
O
C
G
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
d
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
a
d
 
b
o
d
i
e
s
 
o
n
l
y
 
i
n
s
i
d
e
 
t
h
e
 
C
T
U
/
C
T
C
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
,
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
M
S
P
P
 
w
a
s
 
i
n
 
c
h
a
r
g
e
 
o
f
 
b
u
r
i
a
l
s
.
 
D
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
m
o
r
t
u
a
r
y
 
k
i
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
 
w
e
r
e
 
o
f
f
e
r
e
d
,
 
b
u
t
 
t
h
e
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
i
s
 
i
s
 
d
i
f
f
i
c
u
l
t
 
t
o
 
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
e
.
 
D
e
a
d
 
b
o
d
y
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
r
u
r
a
l
 
a
r
e
a
s
 
w
a
s
 
n
o
t
 
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
 
b
y
 
O
C
G
.
 
T
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
 
o
f
 
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
s
 
 
I
n
 
b
o
t
h
 
N
o
r
d
 
a
n
d
 
O
u
e
s
t
 
d
e
p
a
r
t
m
e
n
t
s
,
 
M
S
F
 
r
e
n
t
e
d
 
l
o
c
a
l
 
m
e
a
n
s
 
o
f
 
t
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
 
(
e
g
 
t
a
p
-
t
a
p
s
)
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
f
e
r
r
a
l
 
o
f
 
c
h
o
l
e
r
a
 
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
a
r
e
a
.
 
I
n
 
L
é
o
g
â
n
e
,
 
t
h
e
s
e
 
v
e
h
i
c
l
e
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
a
d
a
p
t
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
c
h
o
l
e
r
a
 
b
e
d
s
 
a
n
d
 
p
l
a
s
t
i
c
 
s
h
e
e
t
i
n
g
.
 
T
h
e
r
e
 
w
a
s
 
a
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
 
p
h
o
n
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
c
a
l
l
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
c
h
o
l
e
r
a
 
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
 
t
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
.
 
F
o
r
 
t
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
 
o
n
 
f
o
o
t
,
 
a
l
l
 
O
R
P
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
e
q
u
i
p
p
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
s
t
r
e
t
c
h
e
r
s
 
f
o
r
 
c
a
r
r
y
i
n
g
 
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
s
.
 
 
 
 